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When the primary outcome is hard to collect, surrogate endpoint is
typically used as a substitute. However, even when the treatment has
a positive average causal effect (ACE) on the surrogate endpoint, which
also has a positive ACE on the primary outcome, it is still possible that
the treatment has a negative ACE on the primary outcome. Such a phe-
nomenon is called the surrogate paradox and greatly challenges the use of
surrogate. In this paper, we provide novel criteria to exclude the surrogate
paradox. Unlike other conditions previously proposed, our conditions are
testable since they only involve observed data. Furthermore, our criteria
are optimal in the sense that they are sufficient and “almost necessary”
to exclude the paradox: if the conditions are satisfied, the surrogate para-
dox is guaranteed to be absent while if the conditions fail, there exists
a data generating process with surrogate paradox that can generate the
same observed data. That is, our criteria capture all the information in
the observed data to exclude the surrogate paradox rather than relying
on unverifiable distributional assumptions.
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1 Introduction
In many biomedical and econometric studies, the measurement of the primary
endpoint may be expensive, inconvenient or infeasible to collect in a practical length of
time. In such cases, surrogate variables or biomarkers are usually used as substitutes
for the primary outcomes. For example, in cancer studies, the primary outcome is
death, thus a surrogate endpoint is usually chosen to be tumor shrinkage or other
laboratory measure to reduce the cost or the duration of the clinical trials [5].
A common misunderstanding of the surrogate endpoint is that a strong association
between a surrogate and the primary outcome makes the surrogate a valid replacement
for the primary outcome. However, such association does not justify the use of a
surrogate: the effect of the treatment on the surrogate endpoint may not be a good
predictor of the effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest. As illustrated
in [2], even with perfect correlation between the surrogate and the primary outcome,
a positive treatment effect on the surrogate may still lead to a negative effect on the
primary outcome.
Good surrogate is difficult to find [3], and the misuse of a surrogate may lead to
severe consequences or even disasters [5, 14, 15]. For example, lipid levels, especially
total cholesterol levels are significant predictors of cardiovascular-related mortality,
thus the lipid lowering has been used as a surrogate for the reduction in mortality.
However, Gordon [8] found that the use of cholesterol-lowering agents actually led to
increase in overall mortality. Moore [15] reported another example: anti-arrythmia
drug Tamnbocor successfully suppresses arrythmia but resulted in the death of over
50,000 people.
To address this, different criteria have been proposed to evaluate the surrogate
endpoints. The Prentice’s criterion [19], also known as the statistical surrogate crite-
rion, was the first operational criterion proposed to assess the validity of a surrogate.
Given the surrogate, the criterion requires the conditional independence of the treat-
ment and the primary endpoint. Intuitively, it requires the surrogate to capture all
the relationship between the treatment and the primary outcome. Frangakis and Ru-
bin [6] pointed out that the Prentice’s criterion may not satisfy the property of causal
necessity, i.e., the absence of the individual treatment effect on the surrogate indi-
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cates the absence of the treatment effect on the primary outcome. Instead, under the
principal strata framework they proposed a principal surrogate criterion satisfies the
property. Gilbert and Hudgens [7] introduced the concept of causal effect predictive-
ness (CEP) surface to evaluate a principal surrogate. However, the principal surrogate
criterion still lacks transportability in the sense that it relies on both the surrogate
and the outcome to be available [17]. Additionally, Pearl and Bareinboim [18] pre-
sented counter-examples: a surrogate is a robust predictor of the treatment effect on
the outcome but fails the principal surrogacy criterion as well as a surrogate satisfies
the criterion but is useless as a predictor. Lauritzen [11] proposed a strong surrogate
criterion using the language of graphical models. The key requirement of the strong
surrogate criterion is that the treatment affects the primary outcome only through the
surrogate endpoint. In other words, the strong surrogate fully mediates the effect of
treatment on the outcome. By definition, a strong surrogate satisfies causal necessity
and is also a principal surrogate.
However, all of the above criteria suffer from the surrogate paradox [4]. As men-
tioned, a positive correlation between the surrogate and outcome does not make a
good surrogate. The surrogate paradox implies that even a surrogate has a positive
average causal effect (ACE) on the true endpoint, a positive average treatment ef-
fect on the surrogate may still lead to a negative treatment effect on the primary
outcome. Chen et al. [4] also demonstrated that the surrogate paradox can manifest
even in randomized trials: although the treatment is randomized, the surrogate and
primary outcome may still be confounded by some unmeasured confounders. To make
progress, they provided sufficient conditions on the joint distribution of unmeasured
confounders, surrogate and primary outcome to avoid the paradox. However, the
conditions they proposed involve the unobserved confounders thus are untestable. Ju
and Geng [10] and Wu et al. [27] considered using the distributional causal effects
(DCE) as the measure of causal effects and derived sufficient conditions to avoid the
paradox. Their conditions involve the outcome distributions of both the treatment
and control arms, which are generally not completely observed in a case that involves
surrogate endpoints.
In this paper, we propose novel criteria to avoid the surrogate paradox in ran-
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domized controlled trials with only surrogate being collected. We utilize the outcome
information of the control arm from a previous study. We show that it is not enough
to avoid the surrogate paradox merely with the ACE of surrogate on outcome being
positive, instead, we require its magnitude to pass certain positive threshold.
Our work of avoiding surrogate paradox is novel in several aspects. First, our data
setting is very common and useful in practice. When it is of interest to assess the
effect on the primary outcome of a new treatment versus a reference treatment, our
conditions enable us to predict the sign of the treatment effect on the primary outcome
in the new randomized controlled trial without collection of the outcome. Second,
our conditions for the surrogate has transportability in the sense that the information
about the causal relationship between the surrogate and the primary outcome from a
previous study could be used in the current study. Third, our methods could be used
to exclude the existence of surrogate paradox using the observed data rather than
relying on unverifiable distributional assumptions. Finally, our criteria are optimal in
the sense that they are sufficient and “almost necessary” if the conditions are satisfied,
the surrogate paradox is guaranteed to be absent while if the conditions fail, there
exists a data generating process (a set of parameters) with surrogate paradox that
can generate the same observed data. That is, our criteria capture all the information
in the observed data to exclude the surrogate paradox.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the motivating ex-
ample. The notation and assumptions are introduced in Section 3. The surrogate
paradox is reviewed in Section 4. In Section 5, we derive the sharp bounds for the
ACE of the treatment on the primary outcome within the class of strong surrogate
endpoints. Based on that, a novel condition is proposed to avoid the surrogate para-
dox. In Section 6, we extend the condition to non-strong surrogate endpoint and also
extend to the situation where the causal effect is evaluated using causal relative risk
(CRR) scale. We apply our method in the motivating example in Section 7. The
paper concludes with a discussion in Section 8.
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2 Motivating Example
Hypertension is an important risk factor and a major cause for cardiovascular
diseases such as stroke, microvascular disease, myocardial infarction and for death†.
In total, about 7.6 million (13.5%) of all deaths and 92 million (6.0%) of all disability
adjusted life years (DALYs) in the year 2001 were due to high blood pressure as a
cause of these diseases [12]. Hypertension is even more common in people with type
2 diabetes than in the general population. Stamler et al. [24] suggested that diabetes
mellitus increases the risk of cardiovascular disease by a factor of two to three at
every level of systolic blood pressure (SBP).
The collection of the development of cardiovascular disease or death usually require
long duration of the study. Thus in many countries may approve anti-hypertension
drug based on the evidence of surrogate efficacy; that is, such drugs reduce blood pres-
sure [5]. However, based on a population-based case-control study, Psaty et al. [20]
suggested that the anti-hypertension drug calcium channel blockers may be associ-
ated with an increased risk for myocardial infarction among hypertensive patients.
Such undesirable association suggests the need for careful investigation of the use of
blood pressure as a valid surrogate.
In order to promote the benefit of blood pressure lowering and blood pressure
management, the Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on Prevention,
Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure (JNC 7) recommended
starting drug treatment in patients with diabetes who have SBPs of 130 mm Hg or
higher, with a treatment goal of reducing SBP to below 130 mm Hg.
To justify such recommendations, the Action to Control Cardiovascular Risk in
Diabetes (ACCORD) group conducted a randomized trial at 77 clinical sites from
seven networks in the United States and Canada [25]. The ACCORD blood pressure
trial aimed to compare an intensive therapy (a therapeutic strategy that targets a
SBP < 120 mmHg) with a standard therapy (a strategy that targets a SBP of < 140
mmHg). A total of 4733 participants with type 2 diabetes were randomly assigned
†For example, Lawes et al. [12] found that about 54% of stroke, 47% of ischaemic heart disease,
75% of hypertensive disease, and 25% of other cardiovascular disease worldwide were attributable
to high blood pressure.
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to intensive or standard therapy and were followed for 4.7 years on average. Baseline
characteristics were generally similar between the two groups. After 1 year, the
mean SBP was 119.3 mm Hg in the intensive therapy group and 133.5 mm Hg in
the standard therapy group. Since the long term benefit of blood pressure lowering
has been used as evidence for policy making and clinical recommendation [13, 16],
the primary outcome in our analysis is the death from cardiovascular causes over 10
years.
Although the intensive therapy was new, the standard strategy has been adopted
in previous trials. The United Kingdom Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) is a
prospective observational study [1]. The study population consists of 4801 hyperten-
sive participants in an epidemiological component and 1148 patients with hyperten-
sion from a blood control component. The patients from the UKPDS blood control
component received treatment to control their blood pressure with a β blocker or an
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor to control their SBP to <150 mmHg or to
even less tight control. If the target blood pressure was not met, additional agents
were prescribed including a loop diuretic, a calcium channel blocker, and a vasodila-
tor. The median follow-up time for all cause mortality was 10.5 years.
Thus, available information comes from three resources: (1) the data of both
surrogate endpoint and primary endpoint of patients using standard therapy from
the UKPDS cohort (2) the data of surrogate endpoints of patients using standard or
intensive therapy from the ACCORD randomized controlled trial and (3) the causal
relationship between elevated blood pressure (surrogate endpoint) and the mortality
(primary outcome).
3 Notation and Assumptions
Let T denote the treatment variable, Y the primary outcome and S the surrogate
endpoint. We restrict T , S and Y to be binary throughout the paper. Let X denote
the observed covariates and let U denote the unobserved confounder that affects both
S and Y . We do not impose any restrictions on the unmeasured confounder U and it
can be discrete or continuous. Let t denote the possible value T could take (t = 1 for
5
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Figure 1: Causal diagram of the strong surrogate S for the effect of the treatment T
on outcome Y .
treatment and t = 0 for placebo). We assume larger values indicate better results for
both S and Y . Under the Stable Unite Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) [22],
let Yts denote the potential outcomes of the primary endpoint if the treatment and the
surrogate were set to T = t and S = s by an external intervention on T and S. Let St
denote the potential outcome of surrogate if the treatment was set to T = t. We may
also use the notation YT=t as the potential primary outcome when the intervention
is only to set T = t. Let ACE(T → Y ) denote the ACE of the treatment T on the
outcome Y , i.e., ACE(T → Y ) = P (YT=1 = 1) − P (YT=0 = 1). Likewise, we define
ACE(T → S) and ACE(S → Y ) as the ACE of T on S and S on Y respectively.
Similarly, we can define the stratified ACE based on the values of observed covariates
X. For example, define ACE(T → Y |X = x) to be the ACE of treatment T on
outcome Y among the subgroups of people whose covariates X take value x. We
make the following randomization assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (Randomization) T⊥(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, S0, S1, U).
The randomization assumption can be relaxed by the conditional ignorability
assumption: suppose T is independent of all potential outcomes and unmeasured
confounder U conditional on X, i.e., T⊥(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, S0, S1, U)|X.
To ease the illustration, we first demonstrate our methods within the class of
strong surrogates.
Assumption 2. (Strong Surrogate) The causal diagram in Figure 1 is valid.
A surrogate is a strong surrogate for the effect of the treatment T on the outcome
Y if the entire treatment effect on the outcome goes through the surrogate [11]. In
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Table 1: Probabilities of sixteen potential outcomes types in the strong surrogate
scenario
YS=0 = 0 YS=0 = 0 YS=0 = 1 YS=0 = 1
YS=1 = 0 YS=1 = 1 YS=1 = 0 YS=1 = 1
ST=0 = 0, ST=1 = 0 q00 q01 q02 q03
ST=0 = 0, ST=1 = 1 q10 q11 q12 q13
ST=0 = 1, ST=1 = 0 q20 q21 q22 q23
ST=0 = 1, ST=1 = 1 q30 q31 q32 q33
the mediation literature, S is called to fully mediate the effect from T to Y . We can
also interpret T as an instrumental variable for surrogate S on Y .
Under assumption 2, it is easy to see that Yts does not depend on t, i.e., Yts = Ys.
We will omit the subscript t and denote the potential outcome as Ys hereafter, unless
otherwise specified. Hence there are four possible values for the vector (Y0, Y1) with
Ys ∈ {0, 1} for s = 0, 1. Additionally, there are also four possible values for the vector
(S0, S1) with St ∈ {0, 1} for t = 0, 1. Thus, we have 4 × 4 = 16 possible values
concerning the vector of the potential outcomes (Y0, Y1, S0, S1). Let qij ≥ 0 denote
the proportion of getting each possible value of (Y0, Y1, S0, S1) in the whole population
for i, j = 0, . . . , 3 (as shown in Table 1), e.g., q01 = P (YS=0 = 0, YS=1 = 1, ST=0 =
0, ST=1 = 0).
Thus, the ACE of T on Y can be expressed as:
ACE(T → Y )
= P (YT=1 = 1)− P (YT=0 = 1)
=
∑
s=0,1
P (YT=1 = 1, S1 = s)−
∑
s=0,1
P (YT=0 = 1, S0 = s)
= P (YS=0 = 1, S1 = 0) + P (YS=1 = 1, S1 = 1)− P (YS=0 = 1, S0 = 0)− P (YS=1 = 1, S0 = 1)
= q22 + q11 − q12 − q21.
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Generally, in a randomization study where a surrogate endpoint S is collected as
opposed to the outcome Y , the ACE(T → Y ) can not be estimated without strong
modeling assumptions. The surrogate paradox reviewed in the next section indicates
that even the sign of ACE(T → Y ) is not easy to predict in general.
4 Surrogate Paradox
Chen et al. [4] defined the phenomenon of surrogate paradox as follows:
(a) A treatment has a positive ACE on a surrogate which in turn has a positive ACE
on a primary outcome, but the treatment has a negative ACE on the primary
outcome, i.e., ACE(T → S) > 0 and ACE(S → Y ) > 0, but ACE(T → Y ) < 0.
We can also have the following surrogate paradox phenomenon by redefining T ∗ =
1− T , S∗ = 1− S, Y ∗ = 1− Y :
(b) A treatment has a positive ACE on a surrogate which in turn has a negative ACE
on a primary outcome, but the treatment has a positive ACE on the primary
outcome, i.e., ACE(T → S) > 0 and ACE(S → Y ) < 0, but ACE(T → Y ) > 0;
(c) A treatment has a negative ACE on a surrogate which in turn has a positive ACE
on a primary outcome, but the treatment has a positive ACE on the primary
outcome, i.e., ACE(T → S) < 0 and ACE(S → Y ) > 0, but ACE(T → Y ) > 0;
(d) A treatment has a negative ACE on a surrogate which in turn has a negative
ACE on a primary outcome, but the treatment has a negative ACE on the
primary outcome, i.e., ACE(T → S) < 0 and ACE(S → Y ) < 0, but ACE(T →
Y ) < 0.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the definition (a) of the surrogate paradox
and hereafter we assume that the ACE(T → S) and ACE(S → Y ) are both positive.
For a good surrogate, the sign of ACE(T → Y ) should be the same as the sign of
the product of ACE(T → S) and ACE(S → Y ). But the phenomena above violates
this. For illustration, Chen et al. [4] considered the example of antiarrhythmic drugs.
They assumed that the surrogate is a strong surrogate and that all the variables
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Table 2: Example of antiarrhythmic drugs in [4]
P (S = 1|U, T ) P (Y = 1|U, S)
T = 0 T = 1 S = 0 S = 1
U = 0 0.98 0.79 0.00 0.98
U = 1 0.02 0.99 0.98 0.99
including the confounder U are binary. The probabilities they considered are P (T =
1) = 0.5, P (U = 1) = 0.7 and others given in Table 2. From these probabilities we
can have ACE(T → S) = 0.6220, ACE(S → Y ) = 0.3010, ACE(T → Y ) = −0.0491.
This manifests the surrogate paradox (a).
The fundamental reason for the surrogate paradox is the absence of the primary
outcome Y and the presence of the unmeasured confounder U . Since the primary
outcome is not fully observed, the presence of the latent factor that affects both the
surrogate and the outcome would lead to completely unexpected results. It can be
proved that, when U is absent, we have ACE(T → Y ) = ACE(T → S)ACE(S → Y )
for a strong surrogate S. This indicates that without the unmeasured confounder U ,
not only the sign, but also the magnitude of ACE(T → Y ) can be predicted.
As demonstrated in [2], a strong positive correlation between the surrogate and
the outcome does not make a good surrogate. Even if replacing the association with
a causal effect, the mere knowledge of the sign of ACE(S → Y ) cannot exclude
the surrogate paradox. In the next section, we will show that if the magnitude of
ACE(S → Y ) is bigger than certain threshold, the existence of the surrogate paradox
could be excluded using the observed data. We will also show that such criterion to
exclude the surrogate paradox satisfies certain optimality.
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5 Excluding the Surrogate Paradox
5.1 Deriving the bounds with linear programming
In order to provide condition to exclude the surrogate paradox, we first derive
the sharp bounds of ACE(T → Y ) with the available data {P (S, Y |T = 0), P (S|T =
1),ACE(S → Y )}. To simplify notation, let γ = ACE(S → Y ) denote the ACE of
the surrogate S on the outcome Y . Under the assumptions 1 and 2, we have the
following restrictions on the distributional parameters of the potential outcomes:
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) = q00 + q01 + q10 + q11,
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) = q02 + q03 + q12 + q13,
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0) = q20 + q22 + q30 + q32,
P (S = 0|T = 1) = q00 + q01 + q20 + q21 + q02 + q03 + q22 + q23,
γ = q01 + q11 + q21 + q31 − q02 − q12 − q22 − q32,∑3
i=0
∑3
j=0 qij = 1,
(1)
By the linear programming method, we have following bounds for the ACE(T → Y ).
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions 1 and 2, if
{
P (S, Y |T = 0), P (S|T = 1), γ} is
known, we can have the sharp bounds for ACE(T → Y ), denote as [L,U ], where
L = max

L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
L6
L7

≡ max

−P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0)− P (S = 0|T = 1)
−P (Y = 1|T = 0)
−P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0)− P (S = 1|T = 1)
−γ − P (S = 1|T = 1)− P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0)
−γ − P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0)− 2P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0)
γ − 2P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0)− P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0)
γ − P (S = 0|T = 1)− P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0)

,
and
U = min

U1
U2
U3
U4
U5
U6
U7

≡ min

P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) + P (S = 0|T = 1)
P (Y = 0|T = 0)
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0) + P (S = 1|T = 1)
γ + P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) + 2P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0)
γ + P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0) + P (S = 0|T = 1)
−γ + 2P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) + P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0)
−γ + P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) + P (S = 1|T = 1)

.
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Note that the bounds in Theorem 1 are sharp in the sense that they can be obtained
by certain choice of joint distribution of full data (T, S, Y, U). Both the upper bound
and the lower bound only involve the observed data distribution and can be estimated
using nonparametric method. As seen from the results, the width of bounds does not
have a fixed value and how informative the bounds depend on the observed data.
Specifically, when L7 = U7, i.e. γ = {1 + P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) + P (Y = 1, S =
1|T = 0)}/2, the bounds vanish to a single point. In such case, the causal effect of T
on Y can be identified.
5.2 Exclude the surrogate paradox using the observed data
In the absence of the paradox, when ACE(T → S) > 0 and ACE(S → Y ) > 0, we
have ACE(T → Y ) > 0. Since ACE(T → Y ) ≥ L, the condition that L > 0 excludes
the surrogate paradox. Note that max{L1, L2, L3, L4, L5} ≤ 0, so L > 0 is equivalent
to max{L6, L7} > 0. That is also equivalent to
γ > min
(
2P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0) + P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0)
P (S = 0|T = 1) + P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0)
)
. (2)
Thus, (2) can be used as a criterion to exclude the paradox, that is, when (2) is
satisfied, the surrogate paradox does not exist.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions 1 and 2, if
{
P (S, Y |T = 0), P (S|T = 1), γ} is
known, the surrogate paradox can be excluded if (2) holds.
Note that the right hand side of (2) is testable since it only involves the available
data. This is an appealing feature of the criterion. In contrast, if the exclusion
of the surrogate paradox completely relies on unverifiable conditions, there is little
support from the data to justify the use of the surrogate as a good replacement for
the outcome. An extreme example of such unverifiable condition would be assuming
ACE(T → Y ) > 0, which is the same as suggesting the use of surrogate without
justification.
To further illustrate the exclusion of surrogate paradox by (2), we demonstrate
in Figure 2 the partition of the parameter space based on the manifestation of the
11
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Figure 2: Partition of the parameter space of (δ0, δ1)
paradox. For the ease of illustration, we reduce the dimension of parameters by
setting P (U = 1) = 0.5, P (S = 1|T = 1, U = 0) − P (S = 1|T = 0, U = 0) = 0.7
and P (S = 1|T = 1, U = 1) − P (S = 1|T = 0, U = 1) = 0.2. Let δu = P (Y =
1|S = 1, U = u)−P (Y = 1|S = 0, U = u) for u = 0, 1. Figure 2 depicts the partition
of parameter space of δ0 and δ1 according to whether the paradox manifests. Note
that the outer triangle, bounded by the horizontal and vertical lines at 1 and a line
with slope -1 through the origin, denotes the parameter space for δ0 and δ1 such
that ACE(T → S) > 0 and ACE(S → Y ) > 0. Thus, any point in this area
corresponds to a set of full data distribution of (U, T, S, Y ) with ACE(T → S) > 0
and ACE(S → Y ) > 0. The white triangle area denotes the parameter space where
the surrogate paradox manifests while the grey area (including both the shaded and
non shaded area) denotes the parameter space where the surrogate paradox is absent.
Since the distribution of the full data (U, T, S, Y ) is not fully identifiable, one can not
pin point where the parameters are in the figure based on observed data. The green
line denotes the contour line of γ = 0.34 and the shaded area denotes the parameter
space such that γ > 0.34, where 0.34 is the threshold of γ specified by of the right
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hand side of (2). Thus by theorem 2, if the parameters fall into the shaded area, the
surrogate paradox can be excluded by the observed data alone.
Apart from the testability, our criterion also has the following optimality.
Definition 1. A criterion to exclude the surrogate paradox is optimal if (i) when
the criterion is satisfied, the surrogate paradox is absent (ii) when the criterion is
not satisfied, one can always find a data generating mechanism that yields the same
observed data but suffers from the surrogate paradox. That is, one cannot exclude
the possibility of surrogate paradox according to the observed data.
Intuitively, an ideal criterion to exclude the surrogate paradox will be based on
a sufficient and “almost necessary” condition. The sufficiency gives the condition
enough strength to rule out surrogate paradox: if the condition is satisfied, the surro-
gate paradox is guaranteed to be absent. The “almost necessity” gives the condition
enough sharpness to hold as long as the observed data could rule out the possibility
of surrogate paradox: if the condition fails, there exists a data generating process (a
set of parameters) with surrogate paradox that can generate the same observed data.
We have demonstrated the sufficiency of our condition in Figure 2. For a graphical
illustration of “almost necessity”, note that for any full data distribution corresponds
to a point in the grey unshaded area, there is a full data distribution corresponds to
a point in the white triangle area that can generate the same observed data. Thus,
if the parameters fall into the grey unshaded area, the surrogate paradox cannot be
excluded based on the observed data.
The “almost necessity” differs from necessity in the sense that a necessary condi-
tion would require a criteria to rule out the possibility of surrogate paradox whenever
it is absent. Such necessity is impossible to achieve since the underlying data gener-
ating mechanism is generally not identifiable. More specifically, we can only identify
a set of data-generating process that is consistent with the observed data. If and only
if none of these data generating mechanisms has surrogate paradox, the criterion en-
able us to exclude surrogate paradox. That said, the optimality in the definition 1
requires a criterion to capture all the information in the observed data to exclude the
surrogate paradox.
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The optimality of condition (2) is given in the following theorem. Additionally,
in the appendix, we show that all the previously proposed criteria to exclude the
surrogate paradox are not optimal.
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions 1 and 2, (2) is an optimal criterion to exclude
the surrogate paradox.
The information of γ plays an important role in both theorems 2 and 3. However,
such information is not restricted to the magnitude of γ, but can also be a bound
for γ. More specifically, in the appendix, we explain how to exclude paradox if we
know a range of γ, e.g., a < γ < b for some constants a, b. Also, we show that
the paradox cannot be excluded with the sign of γ being positive, i.e., a = 0 and
b = +∞, regardless of what observed data one obtain. Thus, it is not enough to
avoid the surrogate paradox merely with the ACE of surrogate on outcome being
positive, instead, we require its magnitude to pass certain positive threshold.
Note that our bounds and conditions to avoid the surrogate paradox are given
for the overall ACE instead of the stratified ACE. All the bounds and conditions
we proposed can be easily extended to the cases where the covariates are discrete
and of low dimensions. When the covariates X is continuous or high dimensional, a
parametric model for the ACE is needed due to the curse of dimensionality.
5.3 Some illustrative examples
We illustrate the Theorem 2 with three examples in this subsection. For simplicity,
the confounder U is chosen to be binary for each example.
Example 1: (sufficiency) We first revisit the example in [4] which was also de-
scribed in Section 4. With all the information about the joint distribution of
(T, S, U, Y ), we have ACE(T → S) = 0.6220, γ = ACE(S → Y ) = 0.3010,
ACE(T → Y ) = −0.0491, and the right hand side of (2) is 0.3720. Thus the
inequality (2) does not hold and the surrogate paradox occurs.
Example 2: (sufficiency) Let P (T = 1) = 0.5, P (U = 1) = 0.3 and the condi-
tional probabilities are given in Table 3. Then we have ACE(T → S) = 0.4420,
γ = ACE(S → Y ) = 0.5750, ACE(T → Y ) = 0.2726, and the right hand side
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Table 3: Probabilities in example 2
P (S = 1|U, T ) P (Y = 1|U, S)
T = 0 T = 1 S = 0 S = 1
U = 0 0.28 0.77 0.13 0.87
U = 1 0.32 0.65 0.33 0.52
Table 4: The first set of probabilities in example 3
P (S = 1|U, T ) P (Y = 1|U, S)
T = 0 T = 1 S = 0 S = 1
U = 0 0.70 0.50 0.60 0.40
U = 1 0.50 0.90 0.40 0.64
in (2) is 0.4864. Thus the inequality (2) holds and the surrogate paradox is
avoided.
Example 3: (almost necessity) Let P (T = 1) = 0.5, P (U = 1) = 0.5 and the
conditional probabilities are given in Table 4. Then we have ACE(T → S) =
0.10, γ = ACE(S → Y ) = 0.20, ACE(T → Y ) = 0.14, and the right hand side in
(2) is 0.60. Thus the inequality (2) does not hold and the surrogate paradox does
not occur. Note that we have the observed data probabilities: P (T = 1) = 0.5,
P (S = 1|T = 1) = 0.7, P (S = 1|T = 0) = 0.6, P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) = 0.1,
P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0) = 0.3 and γ = 0.2. Now we find a data generating
mechanism that yields the same observed data but suffers from the surrogate
paradox. Consider P (T = 1) = 0.5, P (U = 1) = 0.5 and the conditional
probabilities are given in Table 5. Then we have ACE(T → S) = 0.10, γ =
ACE(S → Y ) = 0.20, ACE(T → Y ) = −0.10, and the right hand side in (2)
is still 0.60. Thus the inequality (2) does not hold and the surrogate paradox
occurs.
15
Table 5: The second set of probabilities in example 3
P (S = 1|U, T ) P (Y = 1|U, S)
T = 0 T = 1 S = 0 S = 1
U = 0 0.70 0.50 0.20 0.80
U = 1 0.50 0.90 0.28 0.08
T S Y
U
Figure 3: Causal diagram of non-strong surrogate S for the effect of the treatment T
on the outcome Y .
6 Extensions
6.1 Non-strong surrogate case
At times, the treatment may have several causal pathways to the primary out-
come that are not fully mediated through the surrogate endpoint. In that case, the
assumption 2 does not hold (see Figure 3). For example, physical exercises decrease
the cardiac output and ejection fraction in patients with severe heart failure but it
may also affect the survival rate in other pathways such as lowering the risk of type
2 diabetes and some cancers.
When the assumption 2 is violated, the potential outcome Yts can no longer be
simplified as Ys. There are 4 potential outcomes Yts and 16 different possible values
of the vector (Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) with Yts ∈ {0, 1} for t = 0, 1 and s = 0, 1. The
number of the potential outcomes for surrogate remains at 2 and the different possible
values for (S0, S1) remains at 4 as in the strong surrogate case with St ∈ {0, 1}
for t = 0, 1. Thus, we have 16 × 4 = 64 different possible values for the vector
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(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, S0, S1). Let qi,j ≥ 0 denote the proportion of getting each possible
value of (Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, S0, S1) in the whole population for i = 0, . . . , 15 and j =
0, . . . , 3, as shown in Table 1 in the supplementary material.
In the strong surrogate case, γ = P (YS=1 = 1)−P (YS=0 = 1) describes the causal
effect of the surrogate on the outcome. In contrast, in the non-strong surrogate case,
we define the following quantities for the effects of the surrogate on the outcome:{
γ0 = P (Y01 = 1)− P (Y00 = 1),
γ1 = P (Y11 = 1)− P (Y10 = 1).
By definition, the γ0 and γ1 are the causal effects of S on Y when the treatment T
is set to 0 and 1 respectively. The point estimates or the ranges of γ0 and γ1 may be
obtained from an external study or subject matter knowledge.
Similar as in (1), we have the following linear constraints for the non-strong sur-
rogate under the assumption 1:
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) = ∑7i=0(qi,0 + qi,1),
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) = ∑15i=8(qi,0 + qi,1),
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0) = ∑i=0,1,2,3,8,9,10,11(qi,2 + qi,3),
P (S = 0|T = 1) = ∑15i=0(qi,0 + qi,2)
γ0 =
∑
j=0,1,2,3(q4,j + q5,j + q6,j + q7,j − q8,j − q9,j − q10,j − q11,j),
γ1 =
∑
j=0,1,2,3(q1,j + q5,j + q9,j + q13,j − q2,j − q6,j − q10,j − q14,j),
1 =
∑15
i=0
∑3
j=0 qi,j.
(3)
The parameter of interest ACE(T → Y ) can be expressed as a linear combination of
{qi,j, i = 0, · · · , 15, j = 0, · · · , 3} as:
ACE(T → Y ) = P (YT=1,S=0 = 1, ST=1 = 0) + P (YT=1,S=1 = 1, ST=1 = 1)
−P (YT=0,S=0 = 1, ST=0 = 0)− P (YT=0,S=1 = 1, ST=0 = 1)
= (q2,0 + q3,0 + q6,0 + q7,0 − q8,0 − q9,0 − q12,0 − q13,0)
+(q1,1 + q3,1 + q5,1 + q7,1 − q8,1 − q10,1 − q12,1 − q14,1)
+(q2,2 + q3,2 + q10,2 + q11,2 − q4,2 − q5,2 − q12,2 − q13,2)
+(q1,3 + q3,3 + q9,3 + q11,3 − q4,3 − q6,3 − q12,3 − q14,3).
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Again, we use the linear programming method to obtain the sharp bounds for
ACE(T → Y ) in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Under the assumption 1, if
{
P (S, Y |T = 0), P (S|T = 1), γ0, γ1
}
is
known, we can have the sharp bounds for ACE(T → Y ), denote as [L′, U ′], where
L′ = max
 −P (Y = 1|T = 0)−γ1 − P (Y = 1|T = 0)− P (S = 1|T = 1)
γ1 − P (Y = 1|T = 0)− P (S = 0|T = 1)

and
U ′ = min
 P (Y = 0|T = 0)−γ1 + P (Y = 0|T = 0) + P (S = 1|T = 1)
γ1 + P (Y = 0|T = 0) + P (S = 0|T = 1)
 .
Similar as in Theorem 1, the bounds in Theorem 4 are also sharp in the sense
that they can be obtained. Note that the bounds of ACE(T → Y ) do not involve
γ0. That is, if we delete the fifth constraint in (3), the bounds of ACE(T → Y )
will not change. To see this, note that due to the randomization of treatment T ,
we have ACE(T → Y ) = P (Y = 1|T = 1) − P (Y = 1|T = 0). Thus, bounding
ACE(T → Y ) is equivalent to bounding P (Y = 1|T = 1) since P (Y = 1|T = 0) can
be identified using the observed data. Also P (Y = 1|T = 1) = P (Y10 = 1, S1 = 0) +
P (Y11 = 1, S1 = 1), which only involves (Y10, Y11, S1). However, γ0 only involves the
distributions of Y00 and Y01, which do not have any intersection with the parameters
involved in P (Y = 1|T = 1).
Also note that the bounds of ACE(T → Y ) only depend on the data from the
control arm via P (Y |T = 0) rather than P (Y, S|T = 0). This is because in the non-
strong surrogate case, bounding P (Y = 1|T = 1) does not depend on P (Y, S|T = 0).
The information of the controlled arm is only utilized when estimating P (Y = 1|T =
0). That is, for the non-strong surrogate case, we only need to observe the primary
endpoint Y from the previous study (T = 0) rather than jointly observe the surrogate
S and the outcome Y . The knowledge of the latter does not further shrink the bounds
of ACE(T → Y ).
Since ACE(T → Y ) ≥ L′ , the condition that L′ > 0 excludes the surrogate
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paradox. That is also equivalent to
γ1 > P (Y = 1|T = 0) + P (S = 0|T = 1). (4)
Thus, (4) can be used as a criterion to exclude the paradox with a non-strong surro-
gate. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Under the assumption 1, if
{
P (Y |T = 0), P (S|T = 1), γ1
}
is known,
the surrogate paradox can be excluded if (4) holds. Additionally, (4) is an optimal
criterion to exclude the surrogate paradox.
As mentioned, when the surrogate endpoint is actually a strong surrogate, Yst =
Ys, thus γ0 = γ1 = γ. Comparing L
′
with L, [L′, U ′] are wider than the bounds
[L,U ] if replacing γ1 with γ in the bounds L
′ and U ′. Consequently, the right hand
side of (4) is greater than (2). That is, if the surrogate endpoint is actually a strong
surrogate but we derived the bounds assuming it is a non-strong surrogate, then we
would get more conservative results.
6.2 Causal relative risk
Compared with the ACE which defines causal effect on the difference scale, the
causal relative risk (CRR) defines causal effect on the relative risk scale. The CRR
is popularly used in the statistical analysis of binary outcomes where the outcome of
interest has a relatively low probability, such as having some rare disease.
For the simplicity of illustration, we only discuss the extension among the class of
strong surrogate endpoints. The extension for non-strong surrogate can be generalized
in a similar fashion as in the ACE scale. Under the assumption 2, let CRR(T →
Y ) = P (YT=1 = 1)/P (YT=0 = 1) denote the CRR of treatment T on the outcome Y .
Similarly define CRR(T → S) and CRR(S → Y ).
Note that CRR(T → Y ) > 1 is equivalent to P (YT=1 = 1) > P (YT=0 = 1), which
indicates a positive treatment effect on the outcome. Similarly, CRR(T → Y ) <
1 indicates a negative treatment effect on the outcome. Thus, we can restate the
phenomenon of surrogate paradox on the CRR scale as:
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• A treatment has a positive effect on a surrogate on the CRR scale which in
turn has a positive effect on a primary outcome on the CRR scale, but the
treatment has a negative effect on the primary outcome on the CRR scale, i.e.,
CRR(T → S) > 1, and CRR(S → Y ) > 1 but CRR(T → Y ) < 1.
Similar to the case of ACE, we also have other surrogate paradox phenomenon on
the CRR scale by redefining T ∗ = 1− T , S∗ = 1− S, Y ∗ = 1− Y , which we omitted
here.
To avoid the surrogate paradox, we first bound CRR(T → Y ) with the available
data {P (Y, S|T = 0), P (S|T = 1),CRR(S → Y )}. With the same notation of poten-
tial outcomes types in the ACE case and let γCRR = CRR(S → Y ), we can have the
bounding problem under the assumptions 1 and 2:
bound CRR(T → Y ) = q02 + q03 + q22 + q23 + q11 + q13 + q31 + q33
q02 + q03 + q12 + q13 + q21 + q23 + q31 + q33
,
subjects to
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) = q00 + q01 + q10 + q11,
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) = q02 + q03 + q12 + q13,
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0) = q20 + q22 + q30 + q32,
P (S = 0|T = 1) = q00 + q01 + q20 + q21 + q02 + q03 + q22 + q23,
γCRR =
q01 + q11 + q21 + q31 + q03 + q13 + q23 + q33
q02 + q12 + q22 + q32 + q03 + q13 + q23 + q33
,∑3
i=0
∑3
j=0 qij = 1,
qij ≥ 0, i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3.
(5)
Note that both the objective function and the constraints are nonlinear, thus the
linear programming cannot be applied directly. However, note that the fifth constraint
γCRR =
(
q01+q11+q21+q31+q03+q13+q23+q33
)
/
(
q02+q12+q22+q32+q03+q13+q23+q33
)
in (5) can be expressed as a linear constraint:
(
q01+q11+q21+q31+q03+q13+q23+q33
)−(q02+q12+q22+q32+q03+q13+q23+q33)γCRR = 0.
In addition, the objective function is still not linear. The following theorem converts
a linear fractional programming problem into a linear programming problem:
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Theorem 6. [23]. The linear fractional programming problem
sup{γ
Tx+ a
αTx+ b
: Ax ≤ β, αTx+ b > 0, x ≥ 0} (6)
is equivalent to the linear programming problem
sup{γTy + at : Ay − βt ≤ 0, αTy + bt = 1, y ≥ 0, t > 0}
by setting y = x/(αTx + b) and t = 1/(αTx + b), where A is a coefficient matrix
and α, β, γ are constant vectors; x is a vector of variables; a and b are constants;
and x ≥ 0 indicates that each component of x is larger or equal to zero. The strict
inequality t > 0 can be replaced by t ≥ 0 if equation (6) has an optimal solution.
The criterion to exclude the surrogate paradox in the relative risk scale can be
derived by setting the lower bound to be greater than 1. Furthermore, such criterion
also satisfies the optimality given in definition 1.
7 Statistical Analysis
We now apply the methods developed in Sections 5 and 6 to investigate the use
of hypertension as a valid surrogate to evaluate the effect of anti-hypertension drugs
on the mortality. In medicine, systolic hypertension is defined as an elevated SBP
>140 mm Hg and our surrogate is defined as a binary variable for the hypertension
condition (S = 1 for normotensive and S = 0 for hypertensive). As reported [25],
the average SBP was stabilized after 1 year for both intensive and standard therapy
groups. Since later visits suffer from lower attenuation rate, we choose the SBP at 1
year as the surrogate for the ACCORD study. The outcome Y is also a binary variable
indicating death at 10 years (Y = 1 for survived and Y = 0 for death). Under the
potential outcomes framework, Lawes et al. [12] reported 13.5% of all deaths was due
to high blood pressure. Since Lawes et al. [12] did not report the percentage reduction
of death due to high blood pressure among diabetic patients, as an illustration, we
assume for the diabetic subgroup, the percentage reduction was also 13.5%. This
information could be more accurately collected in subgroup analysis.
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Since both therapies were designed to lower the blood pressure to certain level,
we first assume that the SBP is a strong surrogate. Assuming the rate of death
among normotensive (number of death divided by number of normotensive people)
is P (YS=0 = 1) = 0.1, we obtain that on the difference scale, the causal effect of
S on Y is γ = 0.0135. By Theorem 1, we obtained the bounds for ACE(T −→ Y )
are [-0.331, 0.165]. Using the bootstrap method, we obtained the estimated standard
deviation for upper bound and lower bound to be 0.009 and 0.006 respectively, thus
the uncertainty region (confidence interval for bounds, see more in [21]) is [-0.349,
0.173]. Thus, both the bounds and the uncertainty region includes 0, that is the
surrogate paradox cannot be excluded without further assumptions. Note that in
the calculation of the uncertainty region, we treated ACE(S −→ Y ) = γ as a known
number since the information is collected from a global investigation [12]. If we
obtained γ from a finite sample study, we could apply bootstrap method to that
study to incorporate the variability of the estimate of γ.
We also utilized other value for P (YS=0 = 1) but they all resulted in bounds of
ACE(T −→ Y ) containing 0, indicating the sign of ACE(T −→ Y ) depends on the
joint distribution of unobserved confounder U and observed variables. Thus, with
the observed data, for the bounds of ACE(T −→ Y ) to exclude 0, one needs to have
γ > 0.688.
We then relax the strong surrogate assumption to derive bounds for ACE(T −→ Y ).
As indicated in Section 6.1, the information of γ1 can be obtained by an external
study or subject matter knowledge. For illustration purpose, we first assume γ1 =
γ = 0.0135. Thus the bounds for ACE(T −→ Y ) are [-0.835, 0.165] with bootstrap
uncertainty region [-0.846, 0.175]. As expected, allowing the surrogate endpoint to
be non-strong when γ1 = γ yields wider bounds. From the lower bound L
′, we need
γ1 > 0.927 to yield lower bound greater than 0. Such large γ is impossible to reach
for a non-pandemic disease.
Finally, we derive bounds for CRR(T −→ Y ) when the contrast is on the causal
relative risk scale and evaluate it using the R package “linprog” [9]. Again, we
make the strong surrogate assumption. Note that Lawes et al. [12] indicated that
γCRR = 1.135. Thus, the bounds for CRR(T −→ Y ) are [0.604, 1.197] with bootstrap
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uncertainty region [0.583, 1.210]. The bounds include 1 which also indicates the
surrogate paradox cannot be avoided in this case.
Thus, we conclude that for evaluating the effect of anti-hypertension drug on
the long-term death, using high blood pressure as a surrogate cannot guarantee the
bounds to exclude null. That is, if the unmeasured confounders have certain value, it
is possible that the treatment has a possible effect in reducing the high blood pressure
and lowering the high blood pressure could reduce the death rate, but the treatment
could increase the death rate. Thus, for the development of such anti-hypertension
drug, it is recommended to also collect the information on the long-term death rate.
8 Discussion
In this article, we derived sharp bounds for the ACE of treatment on the outcome
with a surrogate endpoint. Based on the sharp bounds, we proposed novel criteria
to exclude surrogate paradox. Note that both our bounds and the conditions to
avoid surrogate paradox are based on the observed data as opposed to the full data
(U, T, S, Y ). This allows us to exclude the surrogate paradox only using the observed
data.
In the strong surrogate scenario, the information of γ is important for the results
derived. When surrogate endpoint can be manipulated directly, measuring it would
be possible. When the surrogate is not that easy to manipulate, various methods
could be used to estimate or obtain the bounds of ACE(S → Y ) in the presence
of unmeasured confounding. Once the information of γ is collected, it can be used
later to evaluate the effect of different treatment on the same surrogate and primary
outcome. Such transportability is appealing since it may save the time and cost of
future clinical trials.
If the strong surrogate assumption is violated, we need the information for γ1,
which may be more challenging to collect than γ, but a sensitivity analysis could
be carried out if we know a range of γ1 based on the subject matter knowledge.
Alternatively, one could try to find a vector of surrogates so that all the pathways
of the effect of treatment to the primary outcome is mediated through the vector
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of surrogates. Then the strong surrogate assumption may hold for this vector of
surrogates. The composition of such surrogate vector depends on the subject matter
knowledge of the underlying data generating mechanism. However, as the dimension
of the surrogates vector increases, the computation burden increases exponentially,
which is left for future discovery.
Similar methods could be modified for multinomial outcome Y , however, compu-
tational challenge also increases exponentially. We also leave the conditions to avoid
surrogate paradox for continuous Y and survival outcome for future research topic.
In this article, we mainly focused on the exclusion of the surrogate paradox when
the surrogate fully mediates or partially mediates the effect of the treatment on the
outcome of interest. Vanderweele [26] considered extending the surrogate criteria
when the surrogate is not on the causal pathway from the treatment to the outcome.
He suggested that the confounding between the surrogate and the outcome may pro-
vide a source of importance information of surrogacy. To the extreme, he suggested
that even the surrogate has no causal effect on the outcome, a surrogate can still be
a good surrogate (See figure 3 in [26]). Also, in the definition of surrogate paradox,
he replaced the condition of ACE(S → Y ) > 0 with S and Y are positively asso-
ciated. We leave extending our criteria to avoid unmediated surrogate paradox as
future research topic.
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